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Abstract 
 
The electric grid serves a vital role in the supply 
chain of nearly all industrial and commercial 
organizations. A Microgrid infrastructure can provide 
this service and beneficial non-emergency services 
including a variety of generation/energy sources. To 
demonstrate the applicability of microgrids for energy 
resiliency, we present a microgrid resiliency case study 
for United Parcel Service’s (UPS) three separate 
shipping facilities. The goal, to enhance energy security, 
minimize cost and prevent cascading losses within other 
related business units. The impacts and consequences of 
which are quantified in this study using a Mean Failure 
Cost (MFC) risk assessment measure. MFC accounts 
for the potential loses to identified stakeholders that 
may result from a set of identified failures due to a set 
of identified threats. In this case, our study uses a 
method we call All Hazards Econometric System 
(AHES). AHES incorporates the cost of COOP using a 
strategy that considers the payback period of microgrid 
installation as compared to other energy delivery 
strategies.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Industrial-scale microgrids offer increased 
resilience, reduced risk, and enhanced controls for 
critical plant loads and operations, as well as the local 
electric grid. This paper will demonstrate methods for 
calculating risk, designing a microgrid, and normal 
operation cost recovery. 
Electrical outages affect millions of customers in the 
U.S. every year. Increasing the resilience to natural and 
man-made events of the electric grid can have far-
reaching societal benefits. Some of the largest 
individual consumers of electricity are industrial 
facilities. Industrial customers require highly reliable 
power to properly do business, and an electrical outage 
at the wrong moment can cause losses in the millions of 
dollars per hour.  
Many facilities have backup generation, which is 
both simple and proven. However, as the electric grid 
modernizes, the use of microgrids as a backup system 
can provide benefits to both the facility and the electric 
grid. Benefits to an industrial customer with an installed 
microgrid include: 1) reduced risk from natural and 
man-made grid outages; 2) enhanced resilience to 
abnormal grid conditions; and 3) integration and 
optimization of energy generation sources for more 
efficient and economical operation. 
 
1.1. Reduction in Risk 
 
Every facility has risk from loss of energy supply. 
These risks are numerous, and it is up to the business 
manager to make “informed choices” on where and 
when to spend finite resources to protect the entire 
facility with regards to mitigating the risk of outages and 
thus addressing energy assurance.  
Microgrid designs are also numerous, and can range 
from small, cheap installations that mitigate some risk 
to very large, expensive installations which significantly 
reduce facility risk. Using a value-based metric, this 
paper quantifies the risk of an enterprise system for each 
stakeholder based on the amount of loss that results from 
security threats and vulnerabilities. 
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1.2. Enhanced Resiliency 
 
In the event of energy supply loss, a sufficiently 
sized microgrid can continue to operate the facility, 
independent of the state of the electric grid supply chain. 
Large facilities require advanced controls and 
coordination of assets to operate in an islanded mode, 
but the facility gains resiliency and reduces downtime. 
Many facilities have some form of backup 
generation for critical loads, like emergency lighting. 
Microgrids can be designed to run the entire facility 
without grid power for days, hours, or just long enough 
to gracefully shut down the equipment to avoid damage 
and loss of inventory. This paper investigates microgrid 
designs which cover both ends of the continuum and 
quantify their impacts. 
 
1.3. Integration and Optimization 
  
A microgrid installation typically involves the 
collection and communication of multiple 
measurements and device parameters to a controller, 
which coordinates the generation and loads. A 
microgrid can allow for more active control over a 
facility, by interacting with the process control system 
to reduce inactive processes based on available 
generation for peak load reduction. Microgrid 
installations can now achieve this goal while addressing 
operational goals that include reliability improvements, 
cost reduction and market participation [1]. 
Microgrids also enable integration of many different 
types of fuel sources, diversifying the generation mix 
while reducing the probability of single points of failure. 
Solar arrays, natural gas turbines, diesel engines, and 
battery storage each have properties which can be 
beneficial to the reliability and resilience of a facility. A 
mix of generation resources can help to mask the 
resources’ individual deficiencies, such as 
intermittency, long startup times, and inefficient 
operation. For example, a software optimizer can 
capture device behaviors to allow for automatic control 
of resources toward a common goal. 
 
1.4. Utility Participation 
  
Utilities base the rate they charge industrial 
customers via specific utility program parameters (e.g., 
cost/kWh during peak load periods). By participating in 
utility programs, industrial customers seek a positive 
return on their investment (ROI) during grid operations 
while simultaneously contributing a needed service to 
the grid. Instead of a rarely used backup, the generation 
can have a more active role in maintaining the stability 
and resilience of the local power system. 
During grid operations, an industrial microgrid 
allows for more active industrial customer participation 
in utility programs. During peak demands, utilities make 
requests of their industry partners such as demand 
reduction. A request for demand reduction can be 
achieved through either the industry partner shedding 
load or increasing generation. The microgrid gives 
flexibility to the industrial customer in how to best 
achieve the desired load reduction. 
 
1.5. United Parcel Service (UPS) Study 
  
As a partner in the study [2], the UPS Worldport, 
Centennial Hub, and Supply Chain Solutions (SCS) 
campus in Louisville, KY demonstrated the validity of 
the approach described here.  
The facility’s risk mitigation strategy was 
determined using the All Hazards Econometrics System 
(AHES) method. AHES was used to evaluate the ROI 
for two microgrid improvement options. The first was a 
reduced operational sort (i.e., closing down certain 
sorting lanes) and the second solution considered 
additional resources to allow continued normal 
operations. AHES is an adaption of the Cyber Security 
Econometrics System (CSES) [3]. CSES’s high-level 
workflow is illustrated in Figure 1. For each of these 
(fairly) different facilities, multiple microgrid 
improvement options were modeled with the open-
source Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) Microgrid 
Design Toolkit [4]. Each microgrid solution ranged 
from a lower cost, with a small reliability improvement, 
to a more expensive cost, with a high reliability 
improvement. Combining these two methods and tools 
resulted in a newly developed approach for predicting 
and mitigating industrial “peak” loads. We estimated 
resiliency improvement, installed cost and cost 
avoidance for each proposed risk mitigation strategy 
along with a coincidental cost recovery benefit derived 
from normal microgrid operations.  
 
2. Background  
 
The DOE’s Grid Modernization Laboratory 
Consortium (GMLC) Multi-Year Program Plan [2] 
Figure 1: The Workflow of Cyber Security 
Econometrics System (CSES) 
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states, “…security and resilience of the modern electric 
grid may be defined as the functional preservation of the 
electric grid operations in the face of natural and man-
made threats and hazards.” 
While the U.S. electric grid is highly reliable, severe 
weather events and cyber-attacks threaten to cause 
extensive damage to its aging infrastructure, resulting in 
extended periods of outage for customers. The 
economic impacts of weather-related outages in 2012 
were estimated at between $27 and $52 billion [5]. Since 
2000, the five-year average number of outages per year 
has doubled every five years, and the average number of 
monthly outages have increased six-fold [6]. 
The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
defines industrial electricity customers as the “facilities 
and equipment used for producing, processing, or 
assembling goods” [7]. Industrial electricity customers 
make up 0.56% of electricity customers [8], but account 
for roughly 25% of all energy sales in the U.S. [9]. A 
single hour-long outage can cause the loss of hundreds 
of thousands to millions of dollars in output, lost 
inventory, brand degradation, and restart costs. 
A microgrid, per DOE’s terms [10], is: ‘‘a group of 
interconnected loads and distributed energy resources 
within defined electrical boundaries that acts as a single 
controllable entity with respect to the grid. A microgrid 
can connect and disconnect from the grid to enable it to 
operate in both grid-connected or island mode.’’ 
Microgrid research is constantly evolving to include 
advanced controls and communication systems for a 
wide range of applications [11] [12] [13] [14]. 
Capabilities enabled by microgrid technologies include: 
1) seamless transition; 2) renewables integration; 3) 
voltage support; 4) peak shaving, 5) economic dispatch; 
6) energy shifting; and 7) black start. 
 
2.1. Case Study Environment 
 
First-generation microgrids have focused primarily 
on priority critical loads, such as hospitals, military 
bases, and college campuses [15] [16] [17]. These types 
of facilities play vital roles to the country and are 
dependent on highly reliable power. 
Similarly, many industrial facilities are critical to the 
daily operations of people and businesses across the 
country. The UPS Worldport facility is the largest 
automated package handling facility in the world [18] 
[19], processing approximately 416,000 packages per 
hour. As an air hub with more than 300 flights arriving 
and departing daily, Worldport has very strict 
requirements on flight schedules. Even a small electrical 
outage which stops the sorting equipment for a few 
minutes causes far-reaching ripples to those people and 
businesses depending on their service. Delays on time-
critical packages such as refrigerated vaccines and 
living tissues could be disastrous to those depending on 
the materials. 
UPS is a global leader in logistics, offering a broad 
range of solutions including transporting packages and 
freight; facilitating international trade, and deploying 
advanced technology to more efficiently manage the 
world of business. Headquartered in Atlanta, UPS 
serves more than 220 countries and territories 
worldwide. The facilities of interest include: Worldport, 
Centennial Hub, and SCS campus (though SCS data is 
not included in this analysis). 
 
3. Process and Results  
 
To understand how a microgrid bolsters resilience 
for a facility, it is critical to quantify the risks the facility 
faces daily and design to mitigate specific scenarios. 
The All Hazards Econometrics System (AHES) is a 
Cybernomics computational method for determining 
Mean Failure Cost (MFC) [20] [21] [22], modified 
herein from Cyber Security Econometrics System 
(CSES) [3] [23] [24] used previously in industrial 
settings [25]; applied to industry standards [26] [27]; 
and applied to cloud environments [27] [28]. The 
cost/benefits risk assessment of the project [2] was 
carried out by computing the Mean Failure Cost (MFC) 
for various UPS stakeholders addressing grid 
vulnerability, consequence, and risk analysis. The 
reduction in MFC can then be matched against the costs 
and risks of deploying them, using relevant ROI 
functions. 
 
3.1. Tools Used to Determine Mean Failure Cost 
 
The value-based metric (MFC), when applied, 
quantifies the risks to an enterprise system on an 
individual stakeholder basis. MFC represents the loss 
that potentially results from threats and system 
vulnerabilities. MFC depends on the inherent system 
infrastructure (e.g., weaknesses) and accounts for the 
stakeholders’ variances in terms of their individual 
mission requirements, that are satisfied via that 
infrastructure has in meeting each enterprise 
requirement.  
 
3.2. Steps for Determining Mean Failure Cost 
 
The essential steps involve I/O components and phases 
(i.e., discovery, classification and evaluation, metrics 
and mitigation as shown in Figure 1). The data 
collection/analysis consist of systems stakeholders, 
system specifications and requirements. System 
components makeup the requirements and the 
associated natural threats that exist. These natural 
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threats have the potential of causing a negative impact 
on the normal operations of the overall system. In this 
study, we address only rigorously documented natural 
hazards (i.e., threats) which cannot be altered (i.e., are 
immutable). The steps in determining MFC, when 
applied, result in the AHES method which was 
essentially derived as part of this case study.  
To estimate the MFC for the set of stakeholders of a 
system, we identify and then maintain the following 
information: (1) the set of stakeholders; (2) the set of 
functional specifications/requirements; (3) for each 
stakeholder row and each requirement column, the stake 
that the stakeholder attaches to the selected service (or 
conversely, the cost that the stakeholder incurs if the 
service is disrupted (i.e.,  Stakes Matrix (ST)); and (4) 
for each component column of a specific requirement 
row (i.e., Dependency Matrix (DP)), the likelihood that 
the system provides that specific service requirement. 
The likelihood of a materialized threat column entries 
impacting the component row entries (i.e., Impact 
Matrix (IM)) is dependent on the probability of the 
emergence of a threat (i.e., Probability Threat vector 
(PT)) and the likelihood that such a threat would affect 
that component. The AHES method involves the 
generation of ST, DP, IM, as well as the PT. We derive 
the vector of mean failure costs (one entry per 
stakeholder) by Eq. (1) as a baseline: 
 
MFC = ST ◦ DP ◦ IM ◦ PT  (1) 
 
3.3. IM Generation Using Mitigation Cost 
Estimates 
 
Several studies in the past have used CSES to assess 
changes (i.e., Δ) resulting from mitigations (e.g., 
investments aimed at improving/hardening the 
infrastructures). The MFC formula [29] maps a threat 
configuration (PT) onto a vector of mean failure costs 
(MFC). When a security measure is deployed, its impact 
can be measured by considering how it affects the threat 
configuration (say, PT' instead of PT) and thereby how 
it affects (hopefully reduces) the MFC vector (MFC' 
instead of MFC). In [30], the ΔMFC was used as a 
measure of the effectiveness of security measures in 
hardening the infrastructure. This measure supported 
the following decisions.  
First, stakeholders can determine whether a measure 
is worthwhile by matching its deployment cost against 
its benefit, represented in terms of the reduced MFC 
(and represented in monetary terms). The decision can, 
in fact, be modeled as a return on investment (ROI). 
Second, analysts can also use the MFC reduction for 
each stakeholder as a basis for distributing the cost of 
the measure on the various system stakeholders. In [30], 
we discussed alternative ways to do this.  
Third, managers can use the cost sharing formula to 
assess how much the measure costs them and use the 
MFC reductions to quantify their respective gains from 
the measure. Using this information, an ROI is 
computed. An ROI enables us to determine whether the 
measure benefits them individually. Previously 
documented approaches illustrated this premise [31]. 
For the sake of illustration, previously documented, 
consider the threat vector has been reduced to the new 
value: PT՛. The gain in mean failure cost can then be 
estimated using the equation: 
 
ΔMFC = ST ◦ DP ◦ IM ◦ ΔPT  (2) 
 
where ΔPT = PT՛ – PT. This results in the gain in 
MFC in monetary units/time frame and shows the added 
value gained by stakeholders.  
The following example illustrates how to judge the 
cost effectiveness of a given enhancement. For a given 
security enhancement measure, the service provider can 
determine the cost effectiveness by comparing the cost 
of installing the enhancement versus the gains in 
subscriber fees collected because of enhanced security 
(minus any subscriber loss that may result). This can be 
modeled as a ROI decision, as discussed in [30] and 
adapted from [22] [23]. 
Since we are only concerned about naturally 
occurring hazards (i.e., threats), which cannot 
necessarily be altered, we introduce a new concept for 
AHES that can be regulated. Natural hazards are 
normally assumed to occur based on historical evidence 
[32]. The effect of a materializing threat can however, 
be mitigated by improving/hardening the cyber/physical 
infrastructure. Moreover, the damage anticipated can be 
reduced if the enterprise environment is altered (i.e., 
harden the system) based on the risk informed 
assessment information. Thus, we introduce a new 
interpretation which results in a change from the 
baseline probability represented in IM from the baseline 
that Component Ck fails once threat Tq has materialized 
giving us IM՛ or ΔIM. 
The beneficial gain in mean failure cost (as 
expressed monetarily by the reduction in failure cost) 
can now be estimated as: 
 
ΔMFC = ST ◦ DP ◦ ΔIM ◦ PT  (3) 
 
where ΔIM = IM՛ – IM. This results in a positive gain 
overall for the MFC in monetary units/time frame (in 
our case $/day). This moreover, shows the added value 
(ROI) gained by stakeholders from an enhanced 
architecture. Equally, in our case, the analysis helps us 
understand the savings produced from hardening the 
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enterprise against natural threats and 
assists decision makers in commercial 
ROI decisions. The resulting AHES 
method (calculation of MFC) helps 
decision makers by putting a monetary 
value on the service that is delivered to 
stakeholders. In general, the 
stakeholders collectively perform the 
organizational mission requirements 
and therefore the overall benefactor is 
the organization or “enterprise” as 
discussed above. 
 
3.4. Estimating ΔMFC – A Case 
in Point 
 
In [32], Louisville Metro prepared its Hazard 
Mitigation Plan pursuant to the Section 322 of the 
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. 5165, as amended by Section 
104 of the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, P.L. 106-
390 (DMA 2000) and regulations set forth in 44 CFR 
§201 [33]. The Plan identifies potential hazards, 
assesses risk, and presents mitigation strategies to build 
community resilience. The expected loss is reduced if 
we alter the enterprise environment (i.e., harden the 
system). 
The beneficial gain in mean failure cost (as 
expressed monetarily by the reduction in failure cost) is 
thus estimated as shown in Eq. 3. In the analysis of the 
UPS Worldport and Centennial facilities at Louisville, 
Kentucky, we considered the unique stakeholders for 
the enterprise as the following: 1) UPS Facilities at 
Louisville – UPS Enterprise Stakeholders collectively; 
2) UPS Facility – Worldport Stakeholders; and 3) UPS 
Facility – Centennial Hub Stakeholders. The individual 
contribution of the respective stakeholders is 
documented in Table 1.  
The collective UPS Enterprise 
Stakeholders at the Louisville complex 
versus their respective requirements can 
be depicted as the Stakes Matrix (ST) 
Table 2. The logic for the ST depends on 
the following premises: (1) a stakeholder 
may have different stakes in different 
requirements; and (2) a functional 
requirement may carry different stakes 
for different stakeholders. The best way 
to represent this situation is through a 
two-dimensional matrix, where the rows 
represent stakeholders, the columns 
represent operational requirements and 
the entries represent stakes, as shown in 
Table 2. 
The failure cost in each column’s cell in Table 2 is 
the monetary amount for the respective stakeholder (the 
row entry) when the system fails to meet each 
stakeholder’s functional requirement. We therefore 
quantify theses variables in terms of financial loss per 
unit of operation time (e.g., $/day); it represents the 
mean loss that the stakeholder may experience in case 
of a failure. 
Table 1 represents the potential monetary loss by a 
stakeholder. The analysis team worked closely with 
UPS participants to determine the best and most 
accurate data to populate the AHES matrices. Data was 
analyzed from the UPS, Inc. second quarter earnings 
report ending June 30, 2017, and was used to calculate 
the Worldport and Centennial Hub stakeholder’s 
monetary loss [34]. The following logic was used to 
determine the Worldport and Centennial Hub, 
stakeholder’s mean financial loss: 
Worldport - From the 2017 second quarter earnings 
report [34], the per package revenue is calculated as a 
weighted combination of two revenues: the next day 
delivery cost and the international package cost. The 
revenue per package is comprised from 80% of the next 
day delivery sort revenue ($19.62 per package) plus 
Table 2. Collective UPS Facilities Stakes (ST) Matrix: Populated 
UPS Stakeholders versus UPS Louisville Facility Requirements* 
Stakes (ST) 
Requirements 
Worldport 
Availability 
Centennial 
(Expansion) 
Availability 
No Req’t. 
Failure 
(NRF) 
S
ta
k
eh
o
ld
er
s 
UPS Enterprise 
Collectively 
$30,583,000  $11,380,000 $0 
Worldport $30,332,000 $0 $0 
Centennial Hub 
(Current) 
$0 $5,356,800 $0 
Centennial Hub 
(Expansion) 
$0 $11,383,200 $0 
* Source data derived from UPS, Inc. 2017 second quarter earnings report [34] 
and from [35]. 
 
Table 1. Collective UPS Facilities Specific Daily Monetary Failure 
Loss by Stakeholder* 
Stakeholder 
Volume Per 
Day (# of 
Packages) 
Revenue 
per 
Package 
Revenue per 
Day (Failure 
Cost) 
Worldport 1,600,000 $18.86 $30,332,800 
Centennial Hub – 
Current 
640,000 $8.37 $5,356,800 
Centennial Hub - 
Expansion 
1,360,000 $8.37 $11,383,200 
* Data calculated from UPS, Inc. second quarter earnings report ending June 
30, 2017 [34]. 
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20% from the total international package revenue 
($16.31 per package). 
Centennial Hub “Current” – The Centennial Hub 
building first opened in May of 2008, with a sorting 
capacity of 40,000 packages per hour. That translates in 
640,000 packages per day (two eight-hour shifts). From 
the 2017 second quarter earnings report [34], the per 
package revenue for U.S. Domestic package ground 
($8.37) is herein used for calculating the specific daily 
revenue per Day Failure Cost.  
Centennial Hub “Expansion” – The expansion of 
enhanced technology in the Centennial Hub facility will 
increase capacity to 85,000 packages per hour, 
improving both reliability and quality of service 
provided to UPS customers [35]. The UPS Centennial 
Hub will triple the size of the current package sorting 
facility to 838,000 square feet, and nearly double its 
current sorting capacity to 85,000 packages per hour 
[36] which results in 1,3600,00 packages per day (two 
eight-hour shifts). From the 2017 second quarter 
earnings report [34], the per package revenue for U.S. 
Table 3.  Collective UPS Facilities Dependency (DP) Matrix 
Dependency (DP) 
Components 
Electricity 
Distribution 
Electric Grid 
Infrastructure 
Installation 
Unique 
Sorting 
Equipment 
Computers Lighting 
Air 
Conditioning 
Equipment 
Airplanes 
Functioning 
&  
on time 
Truck 
Support 
Vehicles 
Functioning 
NCF 
R
e
q
u
ir
em
e
n
ts
 
Fuel Farm 
Availability 
0.2 0.2 0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0 0.3 0 
World Port 
Availability 
0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0 0 0 
Centennial 
Availability 
0.2 0.2 0.15 0.2 0.08 0.07 0 0.1 0 
NRF 0.4 0.4 0.75 0.4 0.72 0.73 1 6 1 
Note: The NRF row represents the case when a component fails but does not affect the associated requirement. The NCF 
column represents the case when no component fails. 
 
Figure 2: AHES’ Risk Mitigation Flowchart 
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Domestic package ground ($8.37) is herein used for 
calculating the specific daily revenue per Day Failure 
Cost. 
Natural hazards were evaluated. We considered the 
dependency of the stakeholders’ requirement of 
availability as key to fulfilling the respective 
stakeholders’ individual and collective requirements 
with regards to their missions. 
The respective components to the stakeholder’s 
requirements of availability included: 1) Electricity 
Distribution; 2) Electric Grid Infrastructure; 3) 
Installation Unique Sorting Equipment; 4) Computers; 
5) Lighting; 6) Air Conditioning Equipment; 7) 
Airplanes Functioning & on time Truck Support 
Vehicles Functioning; and 8) No Component Failure 
(NCF). The probability of the system failing, with 
respect to a given requirement and given that a 
component has failed, is shown in Table 3. 
UPS, Inc. stated in an annual report on Form 10-K 
[37], filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the following.: “Severe weather or other 
natural or manmade disasters could adversely affect 
our business.” 
Components of the UPS enterprise architecture of 
the facilities at the Louisville complex may fail to 
operate properly because of functional breakdowns 
Table 4. Collective UPS Facilities Impact (IM) Matrix 
Impact (IM) 
Threats 
F
lo
o
d
in
g
 
S
ev
er
e 
T
h
u
n
d
er
 
st
o
rm
s 
H
ai
ls
to
rm
s 
T
o
rn
ad
o
 
E
ar
th
q
u
ak
e 
Severe 
Winter 
Storms 
Dam Failure 
/ Sinkholes / 
Landslides 
Extreme 
Heat / 
Drought 
Fires / 
Chemical 
Spills 
N
o
 T
h
re
at
s 
C
o
m
p
o
n
en
ts
 
Electricity 
Distribution 
0.3 0.3 0.04 0.14 0.125 0.1 0.125 0.2 0.1 0 
Electric Grid 
Infrastructure 
0.3 0.3 0.04 0.14 0.125 0.1 0.125 0.2 0.1 0 
Installation 
Unique 
Sorting 
Equipment 
0 0.01 0.04 0.1 0.125 0.15 0.125 0 0.1 0 
Computers 0.1 0.2 0.04 0.1 0.125 0.05 0.125 0.15 0.1 0 
Lighting 0.1 0.02 0.04 0.1 0.125 0.1 0.125 0.15 0.1 0 
Air 
Conditioning 
Equipment 
0.1 0.02 0.2 0.14 0.125 0.1 0.125 0.3 0.1 0 
Airplanes - 
Functioning 
& On time 
0 0.1 0.3 0.14 0.125 0.1 0.125 0 0.2 0 
Trucks & 
Support 
Vehicles 
Functioning 
0.1 0.05 0.3 0.14 0.125 0.1 0.125 0 0.2 0 
No 
Component 
Failure 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Note:  the NCF row represents the case when a threat materializes but does not affect the associated component. The No Threat 
column represents the case when no threat materializes. 
 
Table 5. Probability Threat (PT) Vector* 
Probability Threat (PT) Vector 
Probability of 
threat 
materializing 
T
h
re
at
s 
Flooding 0.3479 
Severe Thunderstorms 0.0285 
Hailstorms 0.0077 
Tornado 0.0012 
Earthquake 0.0003 
Severe Winter Storms 0.0174 
Dam Failure/Sinkholes / 
Landslides 
0.0025 
Extreme Heat/Drought 0.0099 
Fires/Chemical Spills 0.3235 
Other Threats – Man-
Made – Outside Scope 
0.2598 
No Threats 0 
All Threats 0.9990 
* Calculated from Louisville Metro Hazard Mitigation 
Plan “Loss Matrix” table in [32]. 
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brought about by natural hazards or man-made 
hazardous activity. To continue the analysis, 
the natural hazards that threaten the facilities 
were cataloged, in the same way that analysts 
of a system’s reliability define a fault model. 
We used the catalog of threats that were 
established in the 2016 Louisville Metro 
Hazard Mitigation Plan (updated every five 
years) [32], and the Kentucky Emergency 
Operations Plan (KYEOP) [38] modeled after 
the guidance provided by Department of 
Homeland Security and FEMA [39]. The 
entities in Kentucky all-hazards emergency 
plan are required by Kentucky Revised Statue 
(KRS) 39A [40] and is activated upon order of 
the Governor of the Commonwealth of 
Kentucky [38]. 
Due to Louisville’s geology, climate, and 
geographical setting, the metro area is vulnerable to a 
wide array of natural hazards that threaten life and 
property. The Louisville Metro Hazard Profiles catalogs 
the hazards, which were previously identified as 
affecting the Louisville Metro Area. These Profiles were 
created using the best available data from a variety of 
resources, including: the National Centers for 
Environmental Information (NCEI), formerly the 
National Climatic Data Center (NCDC), National 
Weather Service (NWS), Louisville/Jefferson County 
Information Consortium (LOJIC), Corps of Engineers: 
Louisville District, Kentucky Office of Geographical 
Information, Kentucky Geological Survey (KGS), 
Kentucky State Climatology Center, Midwestern 
Regional Climate Center (MRCC), FEMA Hazard 
Mapping website, local agencies and  newspaper 
articles, previous Local Hazard Mitigation Plan’s, the 
approved 2013 Kentucky Enhanced State Hazard 
Mitigation Plan [41], and the 2014 Kentucky Operations 
Plan [38].  
Through research of historic impacts, occurrences, 
dollar losses to date, review of the past State and Local 
Hazard Mitigation Plans and discussions with key 
agencies and stakeholders, the following thirteen (13) 
hazards are assessed in the 2016 Louisville Metro 
Hazard Mitigation Plan [32]: (1-2) Flood Related 
Hazards (Flood, Dam/Levee Failure, (3-6) 
Meteorological Hazards (Tornado, Severe Winter  
Storm, Severe Storm, Hailstorm), (7-9) Geologic 
Hazards (Earthquake, Landslide, Karst/Sinkhole), (10-
13) Other Hazard Types (Hazardous Materials, 
Drought, Extreme Heat, Fires/Chemical Spills).  
Understanding the documented risk and each hazard 
is critical to determining the impact on the UPS 
Louisville facilities. The record for the number of 
weather and climate disasters that exceeded $1 billion 
(U.S. dollars) in losses was set in 2011 [42] [43] [44]. 
This data may be usurped by recent data concerning 
Hurricane Harvey and its cumulative effects in 2017. 
The above threats are cataloged in Table 4 and their 
respective impacts are populated in Table 4. 
The “Loss Matrix” table in [32] provided 
quantitative data that portrays which hazards have the 
potential to cause the most devastation, based on 
frequencies and damage numbers, where available. The 
data was used by the project team to help prioritize 
which hazards should receive the most consideration 
when justifying potential mitigation projects in current 
specific efforts regarding the placement and the 
configuration of the microgrid and its analysis. It was 
the intent of this effort that other commercial entities, 
including UPS, will use this technique in the future. The 
loss and occurrence data (based on the number of events 
divided by the total number of damages) was used to 
populate the threat probability vector (Table 5), which 
is used in calculating MFC. As mentioned [32], this data 
can be improved and Louisville Metro is dedicated to 
keeping better loss information to improve the results of 
this model. 
Given the populated stakes matrix ST, the 
dependency matrix DP, the impact matrix IM and the 
threat vector PT, we now can derive the MFC by Eq. 1. 
The resultant MFC for the UPS enterprise at the 
Louisville facility is represented as the MFC per 
stakeholder in Table 6. 
During the course of this study, a reduced sort (50%) 
solution addressed a way to allow the advantages of the 
microgrid to be evaluated in the context of risk 
assessment [45]. The cumulative amount of power by 
implementing the microgrid solution is also 
approximately 50% of the needed power to run the 
facility. Secondly, the SNL MDT model quantified the 
energy availability (99%) by adding generator capacity 
to UPS’s microgrid. From this data, we reduced from 
the baseline: the component “Electric Grid 
Infrastructure” row in the IM (Table 4) by 50%; and the 
rows, “Electric Distribution”, and “Electric Grid 
Table 6. Collective UPS Facilities Mean Failure Cost 
(MFC) per day in USD* 
Stakeholders 
MFC 
Baseline 
MFC 50% 
Reduced Sort 
MFC 99% 
Energy 
Availability 
UPS Enterprise - 
Collectively 
$4,418,054 $3,768,523 $1,820,570 
Worldport $3,085,953 $2,627,759 $1,253,626 
Centennial Hub 
(Current) 
$557,887 $477,631 $236,942 
Centennial Hub 
(Expansion) 
$1,185,511 $1,014,966 $503,502 
* AHES) is a Cybernomics computational method for determining 
MFC [20] [21] [22], modified herein from CSES [3] [23] [24]. 
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Infrastructure” (Table 4) by 99%. Table 6 identifies the 
baseline MFC for the specified stakeholders and the per 
cent reduction in MFC by hardening the environment by 
percentage amounts of 50% reduced sort and 99%. 
energy availability.  
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The reduction in MFC (as expressed in USD/day) 
was derived by applying Eq. 2. This shows the added 
value gained by each stakeholder due to a more resilient 
COOP architecture (i.e., hardening the enterprise 
against natural hazardous threats). The analysis 
provided a basis for prepositioning backup generation 
capacity, and enhancements that promise cost savings 
and ROI. In this way the AHES method helps decision 
makers better understand the value of the service and 
that is delivered to stakeholders enabling mission 
requirements. These numbers are directly comparable 
and give a bottom line understanding of the potential 
impact, root cause (i.e., source) that includes the kill 
chain from threat to asset and the affect to operations 
and in all stakeholders. 
The beneficial impact to the collective UPS 
Facilities is shown in Table 6. This is achieved by 
implementing the various components of the microgrid 
solutions. The MFC reduction ranges from 14-15% for 
the 50% Reduced Sort and from 56-59% for the 99% 
Energy Availability. Based on AHES’s MFC, the best 
microgrid implementation that UPS should consider for 
their particular facilities’ implementation, has been 
reduced to a business decision. The AHES method 
provides the logic to “grade” the level of ROI (a graded 
approach) desired for this business decision. This paper 
considers the industrial viewpoint and uses real world 
data for COOP planning. 
This work was supported by a grant from DOE. We 
derived the AHES methodology from CSES (as the 
basis) to track many facets of the cause/loss-impact to 
operations. In this way, COOP planners determined the 
primary operational weaknesses and could prioritize 
course of action based on the cost of mitigation (i.e., 
hardening solutions) and the prospect of ROI. The 
artifacts of this investigation will be useful on an 
ongoing basis for assessment and risk abatement.  
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